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Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence 
(CAUSEE): Design, Data Collection and Sample Description
 
 
1 Introduction 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence 
(CAUSEE)
1
 is a research program that aims to uncover the factors that initiate, hinder 
and facilitate the process of emergence of new economic activities and organisations. 
It is widely acknowledged that entrepreneurship is one of the most important forces 
shaping changes in a countries economic landscape (Baumol, 1968; Birch, 1979; Acs 
1999). An understanding of the process by which new economic activity and business 
entities emerge is vital (Gartner, 1993; Sarasvathy, 2001). An important development 
in the study of ‘nascent entrepreneurs’ and ‘firms in gestation’ was the Panel Study of 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) (Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004) and 
its extensions in Argentina, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Yet 
while PSED I is an important first step towards systematically studying new venture 
emergence, it represents just the beginning of a stream of nascent venture studies – 
most notably PSED II is currently being undertaken in the US (2005-2010; Reynolds  
& Curtin, 2008). 
CAUSEE employs and extends the research approach of PSED and to some 
extent the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2005; 
Reynolds, Bygrave, & Autio, 2003). Essentially we identify individuals involved with 
a nascent firm from a screening interview of the adult population. We then conduct an 
extensive interview with them about their new venture annually over four years 
(2008-2011). While CAUSEE benefits greatly from the progress that has been made 
in previous research on nascent entrepreneurship and is partially harmonized with the 
on-going PSED II study in the US, it is much more than a mere replication study. The 
most important extensions to and/or departures from the PSED II are as follows: 
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1. Since high growth firms are relatively rare in any random sample of new firms, 
we include an non-random over-sample of “high potential” firms; 
2. We incorporate additional theory-driven content including packages related to 
effectuation, bricolage, the resource-based view, venture newness and venture 
relatedness; 
3. We include an equally-sized sample of young firms that allows us to both 
compare progress of young firms with our nascent cohort over the same period 
and identical factor conditions and also combine the two samples to study 
some processes of entrepreneurial emergence over a longer time frame. 
4. We select the venture as the primary unit of analysis, whereas PSED uses a 
mixture of new venture and individual; 
5. We study entrepreneurial emergence within an Australian context. 
The purpose of the current paper is to explain and rationalize the CAUSEE 
design and to present some preliminary, descriptive results from the first wave of the 
data collection. 
2 Project Concepualisation 
One major aim of the research is to identify a statistically representative 
sample of on-going venture start-up efforts. These start-up efforts are subsequently 
followed over time through repeated waves of data collection so that insights can be 
gained also into process issues and determinants of outcomes. The overarching 
research approach was originally developed by Reynolds and collaborators for PSED 
and is a central development in entrepreneurship research for the following reasons: 
1. The approach largely overcomes the under coverage of the smallest and 
youngest entities and the non-comparability across countries that typically 
signify available business data bases from statistical organizations. Avoiding 
under coverage and non-comparability allows for describing and comparing 
the prevalence of entrepreneurial activity in different economies. The more 
comprehensive studies of nascent entrepreneurship also overcome the lack of 
data on many interesting variables that restrict the usefulness of ‘secondary’ 
data sets. 
2. The approach overcomes the selection bias resulting from including only start-
up efforts that actually resulted in up-and-running businesses. This is achieved 
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by screening a very large, probabilistic sample of households in order to 
identify those individuals who are currently involved in an on-going start-up 
effort. The potential criticality of this is demonstrated by the fact that studying 
only those processes that result in successfully established firms is equivalent 
to exclusively investigating winners when studying gambling
2
.  
3. The approach largely overcomes hindsight bias and memory decay resulting 
from asking survey questions about the start-up process retrospectively, and 
gets the temporal order of assessment right for causal analysis. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the main components of the CAUSEE study 
and the relationships between these key elements. CAUSEE adopts a process view of 
new venture creation, whereas processes are central in the research model. Important 
antecedents are the nature of the venture idea itself, the resources that the founder(s) 
bring to the venture (including their own human and social capital) and the 
business/market environment. Indeed, it is not only these three elements separately, 
but aspects of their fit that is considered important (Davidsson, 2005b). Finally, the 
project examines many types of outcomes including progress, survival and financial 
measures. 
Several outcomes exemplify the relative success of this research approach. 
First, the PSED has triggered a well funded follower in the on-going PSED II study 
(Reynolds  & Curtin, 2008) as well as counterpart studies in a number of countries 
including Canada (Menzies, Gasse et al. 2002); the Netherlands (Van Gelderen, 
Thurik, & Bosma, 2005);  Norway (Alsos and Kolvereid 1998), and Sweden. This has 
– apart from all other forms of dissemination – resulted in at least 70 articles 
published in peer reviewed journals (Davidsson & Gordon, 2009) including the best 
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cited papers since year 2000 in the leading European (Delmar and Davidsson 2000) as 
well as the leading North American (Davidsson and Honig 2003) journals in 
entrepreneurship. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor has led to two special issues 
of the Small Business Economics journal (in 2005 and 2007) and is without doubt the 
most influential policy research project by far in the area of new and small business. 
As a case in point, at the time of this writing a Google search for “Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor” yields 93,700 hits; even higher than another very well-
known international research program, the “World Values Survey” which stops at 
92,400. Davidsson (2006) and Davidsson and Gordon (2009) provide reviews of 
previous academic research based on PSED, GEM and related studies, while 
Reynolds (2007) provides an overview of results of the original PSED study 
conducted in the US.   
3 What Distinguishes CAUSEE from its Forerunners? 
While benefitting greatly from the progress that has been made in previous 
research on nascent entrepreneurship (Davidsson, 2006; Davidsson & Gordon, 2009) 
CAUSEE has several unique features. CAUSEE has been designed as a venture level 
study. This means that the interviewee is regarded a resource and informant for the 
venture. The characteristics and contributions of other founders (when present) are as 
important as the respondent’s, and when the respondent no longer works on the start-
up it is still a valid case as long as somebody else does.  
PSED and related studies have been somewhat limited in terms of the 
theoretical underpinning and measurement scales incorporated into the survey design 
(Davidsson, 2006). This is largely due to the very large size of the team that was 
involved in its development (Davidsson 2005a) and to the – essentially sound – 
ambition to give a realistic overview of the many factors involved in the process of 
starting different kinds of businesses (cf. Reynolds, 2007). As a consequence of trying 
to represent many complex matters with relatively simple measures that can serve as 
proxies at best. In response, CAUSEE, while still comprehensive, aims at covering 
fewer aspects in a more theory-driven fashion and with more carefully developed and 
validated operationalisations of theoretical constructs.  
One of the great strengths of the PSED approach is that it allows – for the first 
time – the study of representative samples of emerging firms. This is a prerequisite for 
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statistical generalisations and for developing an understanding of what type of 
ventures make up the empirical population of business start-ups. However, the 
sampling approach has limitations for other purposes. A random sample of business 
start-ups is dominated by relatively modest, ‘me-too’ start-ups in mature industries. 
While this category of firm should not be dismissed as unimportant (Davidsson, 
Lindmark and Olofsson, 1998) there is the risk that the sample will not generate a 
sufficiently large (i.e., statistically analysable) group of high-tech, high-growth and/or 
high-potential firms, i.e., the type of firms that according to some studies generate 
almost all the effect of start-ups on job creation and economic development (Birch, 
Haggerty and Parsons, 1995; Wong, Ho and Autio, 2005). Generating a sufficiently 
large sample of high-potential firms via random contacts with households would be 
exceedingly expensive. As a second best, CAUSEE makes a comprehensive effort to 
obtain theoretically valid representation of high potential nascent- and young firms. 
We do this via contacts with a very large number of organisations that are likely to be 
in contact with such ventures. This will allow analysis of the special features of this 
category in comparison with that of a random sample of start-ups. The strategy and 
process behind this sampling effort will be reported in a paper accepted for the 2008 
BCERC (Babson) conference (Senyard, Davidsson and Steffens, 2008). 
Another unique feature of CAUSEE relative to previous studies within the 
PSED paradigm is that it includes not only the sample(s) of nascent firms, but also an 
equally sized sample of young firms, i.e., firms which have been operational and 
trading for three years or less. The inclusion of the ‘young firms’ sample has several 
advantages. First, it gives leverage to the significant investment needed to identify the 
nascent sample. Thus, the generation of the ‘young firms’ sample comes at almost no 
extra cost (the repeated interviewing of them, however, is costly). Second, the two 
samples in combination will provide a picture of entrepreneurial emergence over a 
longer time horizon. The processes involved in the development of young firms are 
both theoretically and empirically different from the transition of nascent firms into 
actual firms (Gartner, Shaver et al. 2004; Davidsson 2006). Consequently, inclusion 
of the young firms allows us to investigate important economic issues, such as growth 
and internationalisation, which could not be effectively investigated among nascents 
since most of them will not show much growth or internationalisation within the four-
year time span of the study. Third, the inclusion of both groups allows quasi-
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longitudinal comparisons at early stages of the project, before longitudinal data on the 
nascent firms’ development has been obtained. Fourth, the nascent sample will allow 
appropriate corrections for survival bias that would not be possible if the young firms 
sample was studied alone.  
Another distinguishing factor is, obviously, that CAUSEE builds on 
Australian empirics. The Australian participation in GEM has suggested that 
Australia’s level of entrepreneurial activity – measured in this way – stands up 
relatively well in international comparison and that at any given point in time more 
than 1.2 million adult Australians are either (part-)owners of a recently started 
business or actively involved in an on-going business start-up (Hindle and O'Conner 
2006). However, the GEM surveys only give rudimentary information about the 
characteristics and goals of these ventures (although we know they are modest in a 
majority of cases), and their development is not followed over time. Hence, little 
information is gained about what leads to successful completion of a start-up process. 
In sum, CAUSEE represents a clear ‘first’ in Australia and has a number of 
unique design features also in relation to its closest international counterparts or 
predecessors. The most important of these are a) a clear focus on the venture level of 
analysis; b) emphasis on theory-testing and high quality in operationalisations; c) 
inclusion of a sample of ‘young firms’ alongside the on-going start-ups (‘nascent 
firms’), and d) addition of a judgment based over sample of ‘high potential firms’ in 
both categories. These unique features strengthen CAUSEE’s potential for 
contributions to scholarship and practice.       
4 Main contents and foci of the CAUSEE research 
Figure 1 above provides a graphical overview of the core concepts and 
relationships investigated in the CAUSEE research. Table 1 lists the main sections of 
the Wave I questionnaire that follow after successful screening (cf. above). The table 
also indicates the degree of harmonization with the PSED II study. Together Figure 1 
and Table 1 provide a good overview of the main contents of the research. 
Conspicuous in its absence in Figure 1 is a box labelled ‘The Individual’. This 
is because of the venture level perspective that CAUSEE employs. The characteristics 
of the founder may only be part of the human social capital at the venture’s disposal, 
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and these are seen as resources just as are financial and other resources that are also 
captured by the questionnaire contents. Hence, it is the Resources concept that 
deserves a separate box in the figure, mirrored by the ‘Team Resources’ and ‘Sources 
of Funding and Advice’ sections in the questionnaire. Important theoretical sources 
for this section is the Resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991) and recent 
theorising about bricolage, i.e., the use of frugal and creative tactics for acquiring and 
combining resources, often for new use (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Hence, the 
questionnaire contains separate sections covering these issues. Some early findings on 
resource assessment are reported in Steffens, Davidsson & Gordon (2008). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
It has recently been observed that entrepreneurship research has hitherto paid 
too little attention to characteristics of the venture idea (often referred to as ‘the 
opportunity’, see Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). In response, the CAUSEE research 
will thoroughly investigate the newness and relatedness of the venture idea (cf. 
Dissanayake, Gordon & Davidsson, 2008) as well as how it changes over time (cf. 
Davidsson, Hunter, & Klofsten, 2006). Consequently these areas are covered in 
separate sections of the questionnaire. Basic classifications of the type of venture idea 
along different dimensions are also made in the section ‘Classifying the Venture’.  
The Environment is not given much room in the questionnaires but enters the 
research via knowledge of what industry and region (type) the ventures belong to. 
Non-survey data about the characteristics of regions and industries can be added to the 
data set. 
As regards process a very important part of the survey is the time-stamped 
gestation activities that we investigate. This has been one of the most fruitful parts of 
previous studies of nascent entrepreneurship (Davidsson, 2006). Our main theory-
testing effort concerning process will be a systematic empirical test of Sarasvathy’s 
(2001) theory of effectuation, which also has its separate questionnaire section. 
CAUSEE offers an opportunity to systematically test this theory on a large, 
representative sample for the first time, applying a measuring instrument that has been 
carefully developed for this purpose. Other sections also capture process issues, e.g., 
‘Bricolage’ and ‘Venture Idea Change’. 
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Assessment of outcomes is a tricky matter in studies of nascent and young 
firms. Because the ventures are at early (and slightly different) stages, traditional 
performance measures may not be relevant or available. In addition, it is not always 
the case that abandonment of the start-up is a worse outcome than is continuation, and 
similar issues arise for other outcomes on supposed ‘better-worse’ scales (see 
Davidsson, 2006; 2008). CAUSEE will employ a range of outcome variables such as 
the pace of progress in the process; reaching certain milestones like first sales or 
profitability; levels of sales, employment and profitability; growth, etc. This is an area 
where design work is still on-going for implementation in later waves. 
As indicated by the graphical representation of the framework, 
entrepreneurship research has moved beyond simplistic, direct, additive and linear 
relationships. Issues of fit and interdependence between the different components will 
consequently be a key interest in the project (Davidsson, 2004a; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). Detailed ideas about these contingencies have recently been 
elaborated in (Davidsson, 2005b). 
5 Data Collection and Sample Selection Methods 
The primary data set for CAUSEE comprise random samples of ‘nascent firms’ 
(N = 625) and ‘young firms’ (N = 561) obtained by screening 30,105 adults. Smaller 
supplementary, non-random samples of high potential ventures of both nascent firms 
(N = 102) and young firms (N = 113) were also generated. Below we describe the 
processes employed to identify start-up efforts and qualify them for the various 
samples. 
Eligible cases that agreed to participate proceeded through a 40-55 minute 
long telephone interview. They will then be re-contacted for follow-up interviews 
every 12 months for four years. When a venture has been terminated an ‘exit 
interview’ is performed and the case is dropped from subsequent waves. Among the 
non-eligible cases every 50
th
 respondent was selected for inclusion in a Control Group 
(n=506) to allow for basic socio-demographic comparisons. 
5.1 Random Samples 
Identifying a random sample of on-going business start-ups - young and 
emerging firms - is a very challenging task. Business registers are not available that 
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capture and youngest start-up efforts or all the established smallest firms. The 
pioneering PSED and GEM studies developed an approach to identify such start-up 
efforts by screening a random sampling of the adult population using random digit 
dialing (RDD).  
To qualify as a nascent start-up effort, the screening interview attempts to 
establish that a start-up is not just a dream or a wish, but an idea that is actively 
worked upon. At the same time, it should be in the start-up process and not an 
operational business. Hence, the criteria must exclude cases that are either under- or 
over qualified (cf. Reynolds, 2007; Shaver, Carter, Gartner, & Reynolds, 2001). 
Likewise, the (non-overlapping) criteria for eligibility as a ‘young firm’ must 
establish the firm is in an operational but not mature stage. 
The samples are obtained in the following way. First, the household is selected 
via RDD. After ascertaining that the respondents are over 18 years old and living in 
the household their gender is recorded and they are directed to a screening interview 
that has been refined over the years within the PSED-GEM research paradigm. The 
effects of the exact wording of the screening items – which can be profound – have 
been thoroughly examined by Reynolds (2009). We use the PSED II screening 
procedure, which tends to be inclusive rather than exclusive of ‘marginal’ cases. 
However, while our treatment of eligible ‘nascent’ cases is identical to the PSED II 
study we have adapted the screening mechanism to also capture ‘young firms’ with 
equal precision.  
Figure 2 gives an overview of the screening questions and sequence (other 
than items 1-3 the wording is not necessarily verbatim).We start by asking all 
respondents three initial screening questions. In most cases the response to all of these 
is ‘no’, in which case they are excluded as non-eligible for the study. Other 
respondents are then asked a series of more detailed questions to confirm eligibility. If 
item 1 or 2 is answered ‘yes’ the case is initially treated as a ‘suspected nascent firm’. 
Those that answer ‘yes’ only to item 3 they are treated as a ‘suspected young firm’. If 
the respondent is involved in separate nascent and young firms we give priority to the 
nascent case. This is determined with an additional question and instruction item not 
included in the figure. Also excluded from the figure is the selection of respondents 
for the Control Group.  
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Suspected nascent firms.  If 4a (confirming active activity to start a business 
over last 12 months) is answered ‘no’ the case is not eligible in this category and 
instead transferred to ‘suspected young firms’ to check if they are eligible under this 
category. Otherwise they continue to 5a, which they must affirm intended (part) 
ownership to stay eligible. If 6a (actually two items) identifies if the firm is already 
substantially trading. If so, the case is over qualified and instead transferred to the 
‘suspected young firm’ sequence. Otherwise, the case is tentatively qualified as a 
nascent firm.  
Suspected Young Firm. If minimum trading requirement is confirmed (4b: a 
twelve month period where revenues > costs half the time) and the business started in 
is 2004 or later (5b), the case is treated as tentatively confirmed young firm. If 4b is 
not confirmed the case is transferred to 4a and tested for eligibility as nascent firm. 
Under certain circumstances cases can get into a loop and arrive at 4b for the second 
time. This question is then skipped and they go directly to 5b. If that question is not 
affirmed the case is deemed ineligible.  
Both types of (tentatively) confirmed cases are then asked what type of start-
up the firms represent in terms of origin and governance. Those that report take-over 
or spin-off are asked additional questions to reconfirm that the case is eligible by age- 
and ownership stake criteria. For eligible cases the screening interview is concluded 
with transfer to either immediate continuation with the full interview (preferred) or to 
making an appointment for re-contact.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Early in the full interview the cases are further classified on a number of 
dimensions. Two classifications are particularly important as they determine the 
eligibility or wording of a range of other questions later in the interview. These 
classifications concern whether the venture is mainly oriented towards provision of 
products or services, and whether it is a solo or team effort. If the respondent confirms 
the firm sells/will sell ‘mainly services’ they thereafter get the ‘services’ version of 
questions whereas all other answers (including ‘both equally’; ‘don’t know’ and 
‘refused’) leads to the more generic ‘products’ wording.  Solo vs. team is assessed 
through a sequence of questions that first determines whether any other owner is 
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involved; whether any other owner is a ‘romantic’ partner, and the total number of 
(prospective) owners. This makes it possible to make the important distinction 
between ‘romantic’ and other teams (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003) and to apply 
appropriate wording and question content for solo, partner and multi-person team 
cases. Due to the venture level focus of CAUSEE this is critically important because 
not only the respondent’s beliefs, attitudes and qualities are important but also those 
of other individuals who have an influence on the venture.  In this regard, CAUSEE 
differs from PSED II even when the ‘same’ questions are included.  
For example, where PSED II asks all respondents “Which of the following two 
statements best describes your preference for the future size of this business: I want 
this new business to be as large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or 
with a few key employees?” CAUSEE asks respondents representing team start ups 
“Which of the following two statements best describes the preference your start-up 
team has for the future size of this business: We want this new business to be as large 
as possible, or we want a size we can manage ourselves or with a few key employees?” 
Similarly, where PSED II asks “Which came first for you, the business idea or your 
decision to start a business -- or did they occur together?”, in team cases CAUSEE 
first asks “Was it you or another team member who first came up with the idea for this 
business?” and words the following question (when applicable) differently as “Which 
came first for the person behind the idea for the business; was it the business idea or 
your decision to start a business -- or did they occur together?” 
6 Descriptive results 
Below we present selected Wave I results based on a data set comprising the 
random samples of both nascent and young firms. Table 2 shows the break-down of 
the CAUSEE. Results for both nascent and young firms from the main sample are 
analyzed (and contrasted where applicable). Cases from the high potential over 
sample are not included. Of the approximately thirty thousand participants (n=30,105) 
who completed the short telephone screener interview over two thousand (n=2,068) 
qualified as either nascent or young firms in approximately equal measure. The 
participation rate for those who qualify is high with sixty percent of those qualified to 
participate completing the questionnaire (n=1,186). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
The main focus of the CAUSEE project is to examine the characteristics and 
strategies of nascent and young Australian firms, and how these relate to eventual 
outcomes. The project will be able to report more about outcomes in following years 
when more becomes known about the fate of the businesses it follows. Here we report 
provide an overview of the characteristics of Australian (Nascent Firms (NF) and 
Young Firms (YF), and where possible compare these with international findings. 
It is also possible to contrast characteristics of NF and YF. This allows  tentative 
interpretations about the success of groups of firms. By way of example, if we find 
that a greater percentage of NF than YF are solo (single owner) businesses, then we 
might initially assume that solo businesses are more likely to fail to become 
operational young firms than partner or team businesses. However, there are in fact 
four possible reasons for this difference: 
1. Survival differences: As above, solo NFs are less likely to survive to become 
YFs. 
2. Rate of progress differences: Solo start-ups remain in the nascent phase for a 
longer time on average than partner or team firms and therefore have a 
greater chance of being included as NFs in the survey. 
3. General-level changes over time: More solo NFs are started now than when 
the YFs were started. 
4. Firm-level changes over time: Some solo firms add owners in the process of 
developing into a YF. 
These four possible explanations exist whenever we observe differences between NF 
and YF. Consequently, it is important to interpret such differences with caution. In 
NF-YF comparisons below we apply the interpretations we find to be the most 
plausible. Later CAUSEE results that use longitudinal data will give more definitive 
answers to what process is driving the observed differences between NF and YF. 
6.1 Level of Entrepreneurial Activity 
Although assessing and comparing the level of independent entrepreneurial 
activity in the country is not the main purpose of CAUSEE (unlike the  Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor) a few observations on level of activity deserve mention. 
First, we have noted above that our random sampling procedure identified 3.4 and 3.5 
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percent of the respondents as involved in NF and YF efforts, respectively. These 
figures indicate a lower prevalence rate than what has usually been found for 
Australia in the GEM research  12.0 percent in 2006 and 11.6 percent in 2003 and 
11.3% in 2000 (Kluyver, Hancock and Hindle, 2007; Hindle and O'Conner, 2004; 
Hindle and Rushworth, 2000; 2003). Recent US data suggests that at least in part this 
difference can be explained by subtle differences in sampling and screening criteria 
(Reynolds, 2007; 2009). By way of international comparisons, PSED II identified 
1,571 NF cases from a sample of 31,845 (4.9 percent) adults in the US, indicating a 
higher prevalence rate than CAUSEE while using closely harmonised procedures 
(Reynolds and Curtin, 2008). The CAUSEE prevalence rate for NFs is clearly higher 
than reported for the year 1998 in the Swedish PSED counterpart study despite its 
somewhat less demanding criteria for inclusion (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000). Over 
all, our findings are consistent with the major impression from the GEM studies that 
the level of independent entrepreneurial activity in Australia is relatively high 
compared to other ‘developed’ or ‘Western’ countries. Our comparison with PSED II, 
however, suggests that the number of start-up efforts in relation to the size of the 
population is not quite as high as in the US.   
6.2 What types of firms are started? 
In this age of large multinationals, global franchising systems and omnipresent 
Internet it may be easy to think that traditional, independent, brick-and-mortar 
business start-ups are a dying breed. That would be a false conjecture. Our data show 
that the vast majority of our cases – 88 per cent – are independent new businesses 
started by an individual or a team. Only some 5 percent are franchises or multi-level 
marketing initiatives. A similar percent of businesses are partly backed by existing 
businesses. There are no marked differences between the NF and YF categories in 
these regards (Figure 3). Neither do Australian results differ markedly from those 
obtained in the US, except for the higher level of multi-level marketing programs in 
the US. When interpreting these data it should be remembered that cases are included 
only if a) the activity of the firm is new and b) the respondent is or is going to be an 
owner or part owner of the business. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
14 | P a g e  
 
As regards online business, approximately 80% of the Young Firms have no 
online sales at all, and less than 7 percent generate more than 50% of their revenue via 
the Internet. The online sales plans of the Nascent Firms are considerably higher 
(Figure 4) but it may still come as a surprise that more than half plan for no online 
sales and less than 10% are trying to set up a purely online business. 
The difference between NF and YF is large and important. As discussed above, 
it may be interpreted as showing that: 
1. There is a real increase in Internet orientated business occurring over 
time; 
2. The expectations of Internet sales for NF may not match the reality of 
actual Internet sales once they develop into YF; or, 
3. There is a difference between those who try and fail vs. those who 
succeed in setting up a business and make it survive its early years. 
Subsequent CAUSEE findings using data from several points in time and 
following the fate of the NFs will be able to determine which effect is the stronger. In 
this case we believe all three effects are likely to be in operation. It appears plausible 
that there is an increasing trend for the proportion of businesses relying on Internet 
sales. NFs may also be naively optimistic concerning their ability to generate internet 
sales. Finally, the difference in internet sales is also likely linked to differences in the 
industry make up of the NFs versus YFs (reported below), which in turn may reflect 
differential survivability across industries. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
It is important to note that the somewhat low figures for online sales do not 
necessarily reflect a lack of ‘Internet-savvy’ in these businesses. Responses to other 
questions reveal that 84 percent of the NFs either already have or plan to set up their 
own website, and 70 percent either already have or plan to join some Internet-based 
community or network for the purpose of furthering their start-up effort. Across NFs 
and YFs some 50 percent have used Internet-based sources of business advice. The 
use and rated importance of such sources is somewhat higher for the NFs, confirming 
an increasing role for the Internet among Australian start-ups over time.  
To the extent that some might regard Venture Capital start-ups entering the 
market with a war chest of millions of dollars as in any sense ‘typical’ the CAUSEE 
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data provides a good reality check. Members of this stereotypical category – while 
possibly important on a ‘per firm’ basis – are so unusual that they are close to non-
existent in a random sample of start-ups. In our sample of 1,057 firms we find just 
two (2) such firms – one NF and one YF. Indeed, findings in the US are similar. As 
pointed out by Reynolds and Curtin (2008) the total annual number of VC deals in the 
US is in the 2-3,000 region, so only a few hundred would involve start-ups. This 
should be contrasted to the annual number of  start-up attempts in the US, which 
count in the millions. Consequently, VC-backed start-ups are close to non-existent in 
the PSED II random sample of some 1,000 Nascent Firms as well. 
A profile of the industries in which Australian firms are being started in is 
displayed in Figure 5 in aggregated form. The following discussion is based on a finer 
delineation into 16 industries. The industries that comprise more than 10 percent of 
either NFs or YFs are Retailing, Consumer Services, Health, Education and Social 
Services, Construction and Business Consulting/Services. Manufacturing accounts for 
5.9 percent of the start-ups, similar to the 4.5-6.5 percent reported for the US 
(Reynolds and Curtin, 2008). The Australian industry distribution for NFs is similar 
across the board to that reported for the US (PSED and PSED II do not report YF 
figures). 
Figure 5 reveals sizeable and important differences between the NF and YF 
categories. In particular, the proportion of NF is much higher than YF in Retailing and 
Manufacturing. The tendency is similar (but weaker) for Consumer Services and 
Health, Education and Social Services. Again, there are different possible 
interpretations. Arguably, Manufacturing is a special case among those that have over 
representation among NFs. It may be that manufacturing firms are more complex (and 
ambitious) businesses to set up and that the start-up process therefore takes longer. 
This alone could produce the observed pattern even if the Manufacturing start-ups are 
as successful at getting started and surviving as the average start-up. However, the 
result may also reflect a higher tendency for Manufacturing start-ups to give up in the 
process due to the cost and complexity of getting such firms going. One plausible 
interpretation of the pattern for Retailing is that many dream of starting their own firm 
in this industry but fail to actually get it going or fail to sustain if for very long. This 
may be due to having low entry barriers while having to deal with large numbers of 
small-ticket, price sensitive customers. The same would apply to large parts of 
Consumer Services and Health, Education and Social Services as well.  
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The same pattern for Retailing is strongly supported by US data, which also has 
the percentage of Retailing NFs about twice that of the sector’s share of established 
firms (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008). The NF vs. YF difference we have identified is a 
warning signal for those who wish to start their own firm in Retailing or other low 
entry-barrier, high price-competitiveness industries.  
In contrast, Construction and Business Consulting/Services show a marked 
higher prevalence of YF compared with NF. The Construction and Business Services 
start-ups deal with fewer and less price-sensitive customers; presumably the founders 
often have one or more important customer contacts established already when they set 
out to found their firms. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
6.3 Growth and Innovation Orientation 
Despite reporting relatively high prevalence rates compared with other countries, 
the GEM project reports have voiced pessimism about entrepreneurship in Australia 
(Hindle and O'Conner, 2004; Hindle and Rushworth, 2002). For example, the former 
conclude that: 
 
“Australia consistently displays relatively high rates of business participation, 
especially in the start-up phase, but growth intentions (through both export and 
technology) and incorporation of innovation are low despite a high claimed level 
of opportunity motivation.” 
 
While the CAUSEE data in part confirm this view, comparative analysis with 
the US reveals that this is not a distinctly Australian phenomena. Indeed Australian 
firms are on par, or more advanced, than their US counterparts. Throughout our 
analyses one should realise that in the vast majority of cases we are talking about very 
small businesses. A minority has any employees at all at this early stage. About two 
thirds in both categories are still located in a residence or personal property. Similarly, 
about 50 percent in both categories are sole traders rather than some more advanced 
legal form, and most founders have limited growth aspirations. However, it is true for 
any country that in numbers a random sample of business start-ups will be dominated 
by relatively modest businesses. Besides, Apple, Google and IKEA also once resided 
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in homes or the iconic garage. An important question is whether Australia stands out 
from other countries in this regard – and if it stands out negatively. 
In Table 3 some comparative indicators have been compiled. The PSED and 
PSED II data were sourced from Reynolds and Curtin (2008). It should be noted that 
the most relevant comparison is that between PSED II and CAUSEE-NF which are 
very similar in terms of sampling and time period. CAUSEE-YF should not be 
compared to the US data, which only refers to Nascent Firms. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
The findings indicate Australian start-ups on average appear somewhat more 
sophisticated or ambitious than their US counterparts and are certainly no less 
advanced. The self-assessment nature of some of the questions may have led to biased 
(probably exaggerated) estimates. However, as the US and Australian respondents 
have received the exact same questions this limitation of the data can hardly explain 
any group differences. Unpublished data from the Swedish PSED counterpart study 
also confirm that Australian founders’ growth aspirations are high in comparison. 
The NF vs. YF differences within the CAUSEE data perhaps suggest a higher 
degree of realism by YFs, which display lower figures for growth aspirations and 
technological sophistication. The difference may also be partially due to start-up 
cohorts becoming more ‘advanced’ over time. Still another reason that partially 
explains this difference is that more ambitious projects have a lower probability of 
getting to or surviving an operational stage (that is, to ‘graduate’ from nascent to 
young firms). While this would be a cause for concern it does not appear to be a 
uniquely Australian problem; similar tendencies have been observed before in other 
countries (Davidsson, 2006; see also Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997). Finally, 
what looks like a trend towards US start-ups becoming less advanced over time 
(PSED II vs. PSED) is probably due to the sampling criteria being in some respects 
more inclusive in PSED II. That is, the latter study (like CAUSEE, which shares the 
same design differences to the original PSED) is likely to include a higher proportion 
of ‘marginal’ businesses, increasing the number of identified start-ups but bringing 
down the proportion of the overall sample that is more progressive or advanced.  
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6.4 The Founders and Their Motivations 
An important first insight about business founders is that the the group is not 
dominated by lone wolfs. Just over 50 percent of both NFs and YFs are involved in 
efforts that have more than one owner. This is similar to what has been found in the 
US (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter, 2003) and Sweden (unpublished)
3
. Those who believe 
‘multiple-owner start-up’ translates to a well-balanced team with members carefully 
selected for their complementary functional business specialisations are up for another 
reality check. In the CAUSEE data well over half of the multiple-owner start-ups are 
founded by spouses or de facto couples (cf. Ruef et al., 2003).  
Figure 6 displays the proportion of Solo, Partner (any two owners) and Team 
(three or more owners) start-ups. This figure reveals an unexpected and somewhat 
surprising finding: the proportion of Team start-ups is much smaller among YFs 
compared with NFs, implying that Team start-ups may be less likely to succeed. This 
appears to run counter to the general conclusion in the literature, which is that team 
start-ups tend to be more successful – and other parts of our data support that notion. 
Yet, it turns out that when we ask our YF founders (the only group ready to report 
such outcomes) about their satisfaction with the business’ performance in terms of net 
profit, sales, cash flow and value growth the Team founders are consistently more 
satisfied than the other groups. The solution to this apparent paradox may be that team 
based start-ups are more complex and more conflict prone and therefore make slower 
progress and/or are more likely to dissolve before getting to an operational stage. This 
would explain the lower occurrence of Team start-ups in the YF group. Once started, 
the Team start-ups appear to benefit from their greater human and other resources and 
therefore conform to the above-average performance generally found in earlier 
research. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
                                               
3 Importantly, this does not mean that a majority of start-up efforts are team-based in either country. 
Because the sampling mechanism samples households, team start-ups with owners from different 
households have higher sampling probability than solo start-ups and those started by several members 
of the same household. 
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Knowing that many ventures have more than one founder we focus on the 
individual founders-respondents in the remainder of this section. However, where 
applicable we have asked the respondent to answer on behalf to the team.  
While Australian business founders come in all ages there is a peak around the 
age of 40. The unweighted average age among both NFs and YF is 43 years, which is 
significantly younger than the Control Group not involved in business start-ups (mean 
age 49). At least based on the unweighted data the mean age appears slightly higher 
than in comparable samples in the US and Sweden (see Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; 
Reynolds and Curtin, 2008); however both report proportions in age classes rather 
than mean age so an exact comparison is not possible).  
One could speculate that business founding as a further career in retirement 
would be comparatively frequent within Australia given its relatively early retirement 
and lump sum payout of superannuation funds. This does not seem to be the case, 
however. The vast majority of founders (82 percent) come out of employment or self-
employment. Further, while 19 percent are over 55 years only 7 percent are above 65 
and among Nascent Firm founders less than 3 percent describe themselves as retired, 
which is far less than the Control Group figure of 27 percent. While many 
international studies have pointed out unemployment as a major driver of firm 
foundation this is not the case currently in Australia. Less than 3 percent of the NF 
founders are unemployed. This is equal to the Control Group figure, so we find no 
heightened tendency among the unemployed to found their own businesses. 
This notion is also supported by responses to a subjective question about the 
motivation to found the new business. We asked whether the decision was driven 
mainly by perception of opportunity or mainly by sense of necessity (lacking other 
alternatives for gainful employment). Over 70 percent founders say the start-up was 
opportunity driven, while only 9 and 13 percent of NF and YF respectively, see it as 
borne out of necessity. The remainder allow for a bit of both or volunteered an answer 
suggesting that although not exactly forced by necessity they are seeking better 
alternatives to an existing job. This dominance of opportunity driven business 
foundings in the CAUSEE data mirrors what has previously been reported from the 
GEM project (Hindle and O'Conner, 2004, 2006; Hindle and Rushworth, 2003). The 
proportion of NF claiming pure necessity motives reported for the US by Reynolds 
and Curtin (2008) is 12 percent. 
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It is also commonly believed that business founders first decide that they want to 
go into business for themselves; that they want to start a company. Then, it is assumed, 
they search for and evaluate several alternative business ideas before they settle for 
one, which they further develop and eventually create their business around. Bhave 
(1994) found that an alternative process was also common. In this second model it is a 
specific opportunity, rather than a long nurtured dream to have their own business, 
that triggers the decision to found a firm. Consequently, no search for alternative 
business ideas is involved; either a start-up is attempted around the one, triggering 
opportunity or no start-up is attempted.  CAUSEE data suggest ‘business idea as 
trigger’ process is much more common than is the sequence where the decision to 
start a business comes first (Figure 7). Only 16 percent of the NFs claim the decision 
to start a business came first. However, while this process sequence was the least 
common also among the YFs it is substantially more common in that group (25 
percent). This may reflect either a positive effect of a stronger commitment to making 
firm start-up a reality, or that selecting a venture idea based on analysis of several 
alternative ideas makes  is easier to get up and running and/or survive. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 8 shows that female participation in start-up activity in Australia is 
relatively high although not on par with that of men. The 43 percent of the Australian 
NFs being female is at least equal to what is found in the US (although the form of 
reporting used by Reynolds and Curtin, 2008, makes exact comparison difficult). The 
proportion of females is definitely higher than that reported for Sweden;  a country 
with very high female participation in the workforce and a reputation for relatively 
high gender equality in general (see Delmar and Davidsson, 2000). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 9 shows that there are marked differences in the industry distribution of 
start-ups by gender. Comparing these results with those displayed in Figure 4 leads to 
an important finding: women are over represented in those industries that  have a low 
survival rate of NF (i.e., an over representation of YFs compared to NFs). Conversely, 
women are under represented in some of the industries with a higher survival rate. 
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This suggests many women business founders are active in industries where 
successful establishment and survival of the business is relatively difficult. It also 
suggests that what may erroneously be interpreted as female under performance in a 
less careful analysis is in reality an industry effect. The interpretation that the NF-YF 
industry proportion differences are an industry effect rather than a gender effect is 
supported in our data by the fact that the NF-YF gender proportion difference is small 
and not statistically significant despite the ‘industry handicap’ female founders as a 
group face. This interpretation is also consistent with multivariate analyses in earlier 
research – including an Australian study – that while women are under represented 
among business founders as well as in the small minority of rapidly growing firms, 
there is no general under performance by females once they have entered the process 
of founding a firm (Davidsson, 2006; DuRietz and Henrekson, 2000; Watson, 2002). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
We also find that that business venturing is well dispersed across the diverse 
Australian population. There are no statistically significant differences in the ethnic 
composition of NFs vs. YFs vs. Control Group members. All groups are dominated 
(81-84 percent) by people of European decent, other tested categories being 
Indigenous Australian (2-4 percent); Asian (3-5 percent); Middle Eastern (0.5-1 
percent); Mixed Ethnicity (3-4 percent) and Other (6-7 percent). Neither is there any 
marked tendency for immigrants or those with parents born outside Australia to be 
differently represented among business founders, except for a somewhat peculiar over 
representation of people with one, and only one, parent (usually the mother) born 
overseas among the NFs (15 percent compared with 10 percent for YF and CG). It is 
hardly evidence that deserves elaborate interpretations. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that higher educated individuals are over 
represented as business founders. The data reveals 37 percent of the business founders 
are university graduates which is higher than the Control Group (27 percent) and 
higher than in the PSED II study in the US (approx. 33%; Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). 
In addition, a large proportion of the founders have previous experience from owning 
and running businesses. Just over 50 percent of the NFs and YFs combined were 
started by individuals or teams that had previous experience from starting a firm. This 
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evidence on education and experience again challenges earlier concerns about the 
‘poor quality’ of Australian start-ups. 
An even larger share of business founders, 57 percent, had at least one parent 
who had been running their own business. This is considerably higher than in the 
Control Group, where 45 percent reported such parental role model experience. The 
CAUSEE figure is also slightly higher than international comparisons: 52 and 53 
percent for the US PSED and PSED II, respectively (Reynolds and Curtin (2008) and 
50 percent in Sweden (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000). While PSED II does not have a 
Control Group, PSED is about the only study ever reported where there is no over 
representation of business founders among those who have a self-employed parent 
(Davidsson, 2004b; Kim, Aldrich and Keister, 2006). Swedish PSED results reported 
by Delmar and Davidsson (2000), by contrast, indicate an even stronger parental role 
model effect (50/37 percent) than what we find for Australia (57/45 percent). 
6.5 Sources of Funding and Advice 
The CAUSEE questionnaire captures considerable amounts of information about 
the financial and knowledge resources accessed and used by start-ups. In this section 
we focus mainly on a set of questions regarding the sources of funding and advice that 
are used by firms and whether each source is of major or minor importance for them 
(we will also take glimpses from other parts of the questionnaire). 
As regards funding, we have noted already that Venture Capital funding is close 
to non-existent in this random sample of start-ups. Those who build their expectations 
on close familiarity with the small business sector – or the Venture Capital industry – 
rather than popular media images may not be surprised by that fact. Yet it may come 
as a surprise that a majority of firms – as many 55 percent – plan to realise the start-up 
without any outside funding at all. Although aversion to outside control is a well-
known characteristic of many small firm owner-managers (Sapienza, Korsgaard and 
Forbes, 2003), the strength of this finding is nonetheless surprising. There may be 
several explanations. First, we have noted that many start-ups are very modest, tiny 
scale efforts that may not require much in the way of start-up capital. Second, some 
founders may underestimate their need for funding; not least the need for working 
capital once they start trading. Third, we have noted that many founders have run 
businesses before; many of those presumably are in control of funds from prior 
business success that can cover the start-up costs. Finally, many founders apply 
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creative, iterative and incremental strategies – known under labels such as 
‘effectuation’ (Sarasvathy, 2001), ‘financial bootstrapping’ (Winborg and Landstrom, 
2001) and ‘bricolage’ (Baker and Nelson, 2005) – that may make it possible for them 
to reach impressive results with seemingly very small financial inputs. These are 
themes that the CAUSEE design covers and have been reported elsewhere (listed 
below). 
Table 4 presents data on the use of various sources of funding for the start-ups. 
The wording of the question and response alternatives varied slightly between NFs 
and YFs. They are both asked whether each source of funding is a major source (more 
than 20 percent of funding needs), minor or not used at all. However, for YFs we ask 
‘within the past 12 months’ whereas for NFs we ask ‘since the earliest days…’. Also 
we ask about the ‘founders’ (NFs) vs. ‘owners’ (YFs). Therefore, while the data are 
roughly comparable, formal statistical testing or far-reaching interpretation of any 
differences is not advisable. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
What is most striking about the data in Table 4 is the very limited use of many 
sources. Representatives of some sources of funding may be surprised at what small 
share of the potential market they serve (or are ‘invited’ to serve). Striking is also the 
relatively small differences between NF and YF. They are very similar other than the 
higher use of personal savings by NFs and to some extent the higher use of customers 
and suppliers by YFs – both a natural drift as the firms enter an operational stage. In 
most cases firms do not seem to undergo revolutionary change in their funding 
(source) structure from ‘inception’ through early life. 
Only one source – personal savings – is used by more than 50 percent of all 
start-ups. Despite (in)famous references to the ‘3 F:s’ – friends, family and fools – the 
instances of loan or equity funding from such sources are few. Only single-digit 
percentages of firms use such sources as major providers of funding (meaning 20 
percent or more of funding needs). Among ‘bank products’, credit card debt is by far 
the most used, and even among the YFs personal loans and overdrafts appear in total a 
more important source of funding than business loans and overdraft facilities. It can 
be noted, though, that personal bank loans rank third on the list of sources of major 
importance. In another part of the questionnaire the Nascent Firm founders were 
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asked whether they had opened a bank account for the business. Close to 40 percent 
said they had done so and another 47 percent planned to do so while 9 percent 
reported they were using an existing account for the business’ purposes.  
With that let us turn to sources of (business) advice. The use of different sources 
for such is displayed in Table 5. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Here we see a more diverse use of sources in many cases compared to the 
funding analysis. Yet, many providers may still be surprised at the high levels of non-
use. For example, some 75-85 percent report not using government agency or NGO 
consultants, tax consultants, or other commercial consultants. Again the patterns for 
NFs and YFs are similar. The relative importance of family members, and to some 
extent friends as well, is lower for YFs; arguably a natural and expected development. 
Somewhat surprisingly, YFs do not rate customers and suppliers important to a higher 
extent than do NFs. As we have noted already, NFs are more Internet-intensive than 
are the YFs. We may note that this is not associated with a difference in the mean age 
of the founders between the categories.  
Chartered accountants are the most important type of paid consultant by a 
considerable margin – ranking 4th in ‘popularity’ in Table 5. In another part of the 
questionnaire we asked the NF founders whether they had yet retained an accountant 
and a lawyer for the business. We also asked about other potential sources of contacts 
and advice – joining associations and networks for the purpose of helping developing 
the business. The results are reported in Table 6.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
The perceived importance of accountants again stands out in these data, with 
only 13 percent regarding it not relevant to retain an accountant. By contrast, 50 
percent of the founders do not believe they need to retain a lawyer for the purpose of 
this business. Notable also is the relatively low use of trade/industry organisation 
membership and joining formal, face-to-face business networks. Especially the latter 
is a cause for concern as this has been singled out in previous research as one of the 
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strongest contributing factors for taking the emerging firm to an operational stage 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
7 Summary 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) 
is the largest study of new firm formations ever undertaken in Australia. The project 
aims to find out what factors initiate, hinder and facilitate the process of establishing 
new, independent businesses. For this purpose, the project follows the development of 
two categories over time; on-going start-up efforts (Nascent Firms) and operational 
firms that started trading in 2004 or later (Young Firms). In this paper we have 
outlined our data collection methods and reported selected, descriptive findings from 
the first wave of data collection in this multi-wave, four-year study. 
CAUSEE relies heavily its forerunners, most notably the PSED studies and to a 
lesser extent GEM, and the concurrent PSED II study. Most importantly, the 
screening process to identify nascent firms and several parts of the survey are 
harmonised with PSED II. This said, CAUSEE has several unique features: a) it 
includes a random sample of young firms (up to three years old at first contact); b) it 
includes a non-random over sample of ‘high potential’ nascent firms and young firms; 
c) it focuses consistently on the venture level of analysis; d) the questionnaire contents 
incorporates several theoretically driven scales, some newly developed, such as 
effectuation, bricolage, venture idea newness, venture idea relatedness and resource-
based view that have not previously been part of a study of this type; and e) the 
empirical context, Australia, is new for this type of longitudinal study. 
Below we reiterate some of the more important findings:  
1. Our results are consistent with the conclusion in previous research that in 
quantitative terms entrepreneurial activity, measured as the prevalence of 
owner-managed young firms and on-going start-up attempts, is relatively 
high in Australia. However, our data suggest the numbers in relation to the 
size of the population is lower than in the US.  
2. The typical start-up is a ‘traditional’, fully independent, brick-and-mortar 
business. Few are franchises or otherwise backed up by an existing business; 
80 percent of Young Firms have no online sales (although Internet use is 
higher for other purposes and increasing over time); most are at this early 
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stage sole proprietorships that are run from home and do not yet have any 
employees, and only a minority of businesses are strongly growth-oriented 
or highly sophisticated in technological terms. However, it is true for any 
country that the average start-up is relatively modest, especially at early 
stages.  
3. Our analyses show that Australian start-ups in fact compare well to start-ups 
in the US in that many firms are founded by experienced and highly 
educated founders and that the firms they found are at least as growth 
oriented and technologically sophisticated. If anything, Australian start-ups 
on average appear more progressive than their US counterparts. 
4. Start-up efforts in industries like Construction or Business Services seem 
much more likely to get their businesses up and running than do those that 
try to set up firms in Retailing; Consumer, Health or Educational Services, 
or Manufacturing. That is, to the extent the founders can choose, industry 
selection is a critical success factor. 
5. More than 40 percent of Australian business founders are women, which 
makes the female participation in business start-ups comparatively high – on 
par with the US and higher than many other countries. 
6. However, many women founders go for industries that are relatively tough 
to succeed in, like Retailing and Consumer Services. Despite this there is no 
indication of female under performance – once in the process they appear to 
do  no worse or better than men. 
7. Teams with three or more founders seem much less likely to get their start-
ups to an operational stage. Once up and running, however, they perform 
better than solo entrepreneurs. It thus appears that being a team adds 
complexity and conflict potential that may make the effort come out stillborn, 
but once up and running the team start-ups seem to benefit from having a 
broader knowledge-, resource- and network base. 
8. The range of funding sources commonly used is narrow. Most start-up 
businesses rely heavily on personal savings and credit card debt for funding. 
Not only bank loans but also contributions from family and friends are 
relatively low in frequency. Venture capital-backed start-ups make up a 
minuscule share of the population of business start-ups. 
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9. The range of sources used for information and advice is broader and includes 
widespread use of Internet-based sources. Accountants are by far the most 
important paid consultants. The low emphasis founders put on joining face-
to-face business networks for the purpose of furthering their start-up effort is 
a cause for concern, as previous research has pointed to this as one of the 
strongest contributing factors for bringing the start-up to an operational stage. 
 
Elsewhere we have reported more detailed analyses of specific sections of the 
CAUSEE contents including a descriptive analysis of the high potential sample 
(Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon and Senyard, 2008),  bricolage and firm progress 
(Senyard, Baker and Davidsson, 2009), effectuation and venture idea newness 
(Garonne and Davidsson, 2009), venture newness and relatedness (Dissanayake, 
Gordon, S. and Davidsson, 2008), bricolage and the resource-based view (Steffens 
and Senyard, 2009; Steffens, Senyard and Baker, 2009) and habitual entrepreneurs 
(Gordon, and Steffens, 2009). When additional waves of data have been collected the 
analyses will also turn to more direct assessment of developments over time in 
nascent- and young firms rather than relying on the assumption that a comparison of 
these two groups reflects changes over time. 
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Table 1. Sections in the CAUSEE Wave I interview schedule 
Section Purpose Applies 
to 
Harmonised 
with PSED II 
Classifying 
the venture 
Categorising the venture on a 
number of dimensions  
All 
Ventures 
Mostly 
Gestation 
activities 
Initiation and completion of certain 
activities typical for start-ups, 
inclusive of time stamps for these 
events 
Nascent 
Ventures 
Yes 
Activities Similar to above but adapted to 
young firms and without time 
stamps 
Young 
Firms 
N/A 
Business idea 
newness 
Degree of 4 types of newness 
(product, market, process, type of 
buyer) 
All 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Business idea 
relatedness 
Degree of relatedness to prior 
knowledge; available resources; 
opportunities 
Nascent 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Business idea 
change 
Different types of changes of the 
idea and reasons for these changes 
Nascent 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Effectuation Behaviors reflecting theoretical 
effectuation principles 
All 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Team 
Resources 
The investment of Human, Social, 
Financial and other resources 
All 
Ventures 
Partly 
Resource 
advantages 
Identification of particular resource 
strengths and weaknesses (RBV) 
All 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Bricolage Use of frugal tactics for acquiring 
and combining resources  
All 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE 
Sources of 
funding and 
advice 
Use and relative importance of 
different sources  
All 
Ventures 
Unique to 
CAUSEE/funding 
info simplified in 
CAUSEE 
Future 
expectations 
Assessing the founders/ views on the 
firm’s future development 
All 
Ventures 
Partly 
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Table 2. CAUSEE Wave I sample breakdown 
 
Sample & Prevalence 
TOTAL 
n % 
Participants Screened 30,105   
Qualified to Participate 2,068 6.9% 
     Nascent Firms 1,010 3.4% 
     Young Firms 1,058 3.5% 
Completed Questionnaires 1,186 57.4% 
     Nascent Firms 625 61.9% 
     Young Firms 561 53.0% 
 
 
 
Table 3. Relative potential/sophistication for US and Australian Start-Ups 
 US: 
PSED  
(NF) 
US:  
PSED II 
(NF) 
AUS: 
CAUSEE 
(NF) 
AUS: 
CAUSEE 
(YF) 
Wants maximum growth rather 
than manageable size 
22% 22% 25% 16% 
Considers the business to be 
‘hitech’ 
36% 24% 31% 27% 
Claims R&D expenditure will be a 
major focus 
29% 25% 45% 24% 
Firm has moved to own, dedicated 
premises 
14% 9% 10% 18% 
Legal form is some type of limited 
liability company 
20% 17% 18% 26% 
Has hired employee(s) 14% 7% 14% 38% 
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Table 4.  Sources of Funding 
Source Not used Minor source Major source 
 NF YF NF YF NF YF 
Personal savings 13 25 15 24 72 51 
Personal credit card 55 53 25 28 21 19 
Money from another business that the 
founders’ also own 
85 96 6 2 9 2 
Government grants 93 94 5 5 2 1 
Delayed payment terms from suppliers 87 78 8 13 5 9 
Advance payment from customers 86 78 9 14 5 8 
Loans from family members 86 91 9 6 5 2 
Loans from friends, employers or 
colleagues 
95 96 4 3 1 1 
Founders’ personal secured-bank loans 83 84 4 6 12 11 
Founders’ other personal loans, overdraft 
or other credit facilities from a bank  
85 84 9 9 6 6 
Secured bank loans to the business itself 92 91 3 4 5 6 
Other loans, overdraft or other credit 
facilities from a bank to the business itself 
94 92 5 6 1 2 
Loans from any other organisation to the 
business itself 
96 94 3 3 1 2 
Equity from family members 95 91 4 6 1 2 
Equity from friends, employers or 
colleagues 
98 99 1 1 1 0 
Equity from other private investors 
(‘business angels’) 
98 99 1 1 1 0 
Equity from Venture Capital firms or any 
other organisations  
100 100 (one case each among NF and YF, 
respectively) 
Note: Entries in percent. Entries may not sum to 100 vertically due to rounding error. 
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Table 5.  Sources of Advice 
Source Not used Minor source Major source 
 NF YF NF YF NF YF 
Family members 50 51 25 31 25 18 
Friends, employers or colleagues 36 38 36 39 28 23 
External investors like venture capitalists or 
‘business angels’ 
100 92 0 7 0 1 
Board members other than those 
categories already mentioned 
85 92 10 6 5 1 
Bank staff member 85 87 13 11 2 2 
Potential/actual customers  38 46 38 32 24 22 
Potential/actual suppliers 56 63 27 25 17 12 
Chartered accountant 61 48 25 35 15 17 
Lawyer 79 79 14 16 7 5 
Consultant at government agency or not-
for-profit organisation 
73 80 18 15 8 5 
Independent tax consultant 81 74 14 21 4 5 
Other commercial consultant 85 85 11 12 3 3 
Internet websites or communities 49 56 30 28 21 16 
Other business media (print & TV/radio) 60 63 31 29 9 8 
Note: Entries in percent. Entries may not sum to 100 vertically due to rounding error.  
 
Table 6.  Nascent Firm’s Advice and Networking Activities 
Activity  Yes No, but will in 
the future 
No, not 
relevant 
Has retained accountant? 46 41 13 
Has retained lawyer? 17 33 51 
Has become member of trade/industry association? 16 46 38 
Has contacted (Gov. or NGO) business assistance 
organisation?  
34 38 28 
Has joined Internet-based network? 21 49 31 
Hs joined face-to-face business network or service club 
(e.g., Rotary; Lions)? 
13 35 52 
Note: Entries in percent. Entries may not sum to 100 vertically due to rounding error.     
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Figure 1. The components and fit of the process of emergence of new 
organisations and activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources
Environment
Venture Idea
Venture 
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Figure 2.  Screening Procedure 
1. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, 
including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?
2. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a 
new venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work?
3. Are you, alone or with others currently the owner of a business you help 
manage, including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?
Initial Screening Questions
(N = 30,105)
NO
to all
Non Eligible  
Case
(N = 28,037)
Suspected 
Nascent Firm
YES
Suspected 
Nascent Firm
YES
Suspected Young 
Firm
YES
5a. Will you personally own all or part of this 
business? 
6a. Has your monthly revenue been more than 
monthly expenses for more than six of the past 
twelve months?
Confirmation Questions for
Suspected Nascent Firm
4a. Over the past twelve months, have you done 
anything to help start a new business, such as ...? 
YES
YES
Confirmed Nascent 
Firm
(N = 1,010)
NO
NO
NO
5b. In what year did this business or self-
employment start?
Confirmation Questions for
Suspected Young Firm
4b. Has the business experienced any 12-month 
period where revenues were greater than all 
costs at least half the time?
YES
< 3 Years Ago
Confirmed Young 
Firm
(N = 1,058)
YES
NO
7. If takeover: Although running this business is new 
for you, is the business itself in a start-up stage?
YES
YES
NO 8. If spin-off: can you confirm that you are one 
of the owners of the business?
YES
> 3 Years Ago
NO
NO
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Figure 3.  Type of start-up. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Percent Internet Sales. 
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Figure 5.  Percent Industry Affiliation. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Solo, Partner or Team Start-Up. 
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Figure 7.  Which Happened First, Business Idea Or Decision To Start? 
 
 
Figure 8.  Proportion Male and Female Founders. 
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Figure 9.  Industry Affiliation by Gender. 
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